The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo - Brahmaputra River aerial view (Hormann, 2014)
In 2015, I completed my thesis at Imperial College, where I conducted 'A comparative analysis and critique of the different perspectives on constructed and planned hydroelectric dams - A case study of the Yarlung Tsangpo – Brahmaputra River'. Find the file to download the PDF at the bottom.
Here is an extract from the beginning of my thesis:
Water for life
‘Freshwater is essential for life. Water is public health. Water is food. Water is energy. Freshwater allocation is primarily politics…what governments in this world do to protect and wisely allocate water resources is hardly relevant when we realize that the major mechanism that changes the status of our freshwater resources is the economic mechanism of demand and supply of our daily commodities, like food, fibres, energy, mineral and so on (Heokstra, 2013).
I agree to an extent, however, what I seek to clarify with this study is that governments, such as China, have more than a minor role to play in the status of their freshwater resources.
Water security – Climate Change
The Tibetan Plateau, equivalent in size to Western Europe is known as the ‘Third Pole’ with the largest percentage of freshwater stored in glacial ice outside of the North and South Pole (Lafitte, 2013). With the world’s tallest snow topped mountains, and the source area of many of the major transboundary river basins of Asia, and primary water resource for irrigated food production for up to 2.8 billion people, the Tibetan Plateau is an area of concern related to uncertainties of the effects of climate change. Concerning meltwater, and in turn the effect on stream flow in the Yarlung Tsangpo - Brahmaputra River basin, this river basin appears to be the most likely to experience reductions of stream flow, with projections for the 2050s showing that such fluctuations will have significant consequences on food security (Conway, 2013). Furthermore, potential energy production by hydroelectric dams will be threatened given the expectation of climate change exacerbations (Madani & Khatami, 2015).
Water-energy nexus
‘Energy and water are firmly interconnected and interdependent’ (Madani & Khatami, 2015). Madani and Khatami elaborate how energy is needed to manage water, be it via purification, desalination or diversion. Furthermore, water is essential in industrial operations, agriculture and irrigation, in addition to powering turbines, cool power plants or to construct and operate facilities that generate energy, such as hydroelectric dams. Madani and Khatami assert that it is the ‘reciprocal dependency of water and energy’ that is the central idea of the ‘water-energy’ nexus (ibid).
Decoupling rising energy demand and CO² emissions
China’s unprecedented agreement to have greenhouse gas emissions peak by 2030, is the first time China have offered a ceiling on emissions, albeit an undefined one (BBC, 2014). Following on from China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), on April 25th 2015, China released their post 2020 climate targets, with ambitious pledges outlined in a document named ‘Central Document Number 12, Opinions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Promoting the Development of Ecological Civilisation’. Targets included cutting CO² emissions per unit of GDP by 40%-45% on a 2005 baseline, and to achieve peak CO² emissions whilst raising the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 20% by 2030 (People's Daily, 2015). This demonstrates that China, a major industrial world player, is signalling their commitment to sustainable growth as a critical means of mitigating climate change.
China shift gears to increase hydroelectric capacity
The State Council released its 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development in January 2013. Aims included shifting China’s energy mix to one that is less polluting without compromising the country’s growing energy requirements (Li, et al., 2014). By 2015 the Plan proposed to: Reduce coal consumption as a percentage of primary energy to below 65% by 2017 Construct 160 GW3 of hydropower capacity and to raise nationwide hydropower capacity to 290 GW. At the end of 2014, China had already exceeded its goal, with an installed hydropower capacity beyond 300 MW4 , accounting for approximately 22% of national power installed capacity (World Hydropower Congress, 2015). Controversially, by 2015, of the 140 GW of government approved new hydropower, approximately 80% will be located in ‘ecologically sensitive and seismically active regions in the southwest’ of China (Walker, et al., 2014).
To reach the hydropower development goals that have maintained China’s position as the world leader in installed hydropower capacity, the 12th Five-Year Plan prioritised the construction of more than 50 large-scale hydropower plants on the Jinsha, Yalong, Dadu, Lancang (Upper Mekong), Yarlung Tsangpo rivers, in addition to the upper reaches of the Yellow. Furthermore, planning and construction has been underway for more than 10 dams on what was once China’s only remaining free-flowing rivers, the Yarlung Tsangpo and the Nu (Upper Salween), with the aim of exploiting their untapped potential. All the while, concerns have been raised downstream in neighbouring India, who share the transboundary Yarlung Tsangpo River, known as the Brahmaputra once it flows into India (Li, et al., 2014).
To read more on the Yarlung Tsangpo – Brahmaputra River' download the PDF below.
Comentários